Prof. Sang Yop Kang

Sang Yop Kang is Professor of Law at the Peking University School of Transnational Law (with tenure).  Professor Kang holds a JSD (Doctor of the Science of Law) degree and LLM (Master of Law) degree at Columbia University School of Law, where he was a Fiske Harlan Stone Scholar (academic distinction) and Herman Finkelstein Fellow.  Before Professor Kang studied law in the United States, he studied at Yonsei University in Korea (BA in Economics, and LLB in Law).

At Columbia University School of Law, Professor Kang was a Research Fellow in the Visiting Scholar Program. Since Professor Kang taught at Peking University School of Transnational Law, he visited Columbia University School of Law as Fellow in the Program in the Law and Economics of Capital Markets. He also visited Harvard Law School by the invitation from the Program on Corporate Governance. He is a lawyer licensed in New York State.

At Peking University School of Transnational Law, Professor Kang has taught several courses: US Corporate Law; Corporate Governance from the Global Perspective; Economic Analysis of Corporate Law; US Securities Regulations; Corporations and Financial Markets; East Asian Economic Structure.

Before he studied law, Professor Kang worked as an analyst and a fund manager. He passed all of three levels of CFA (Chartered Financial Analyst) examinations and a few more securities market examinations.

Professor Kang’s research areas include: Corporate Law (General Theory, US, Korea, China) , Securities Regulations, Corporate Governance, Law and Economics of Corporations and Capital Markets, Banking Policies and Regulations, Corporate Groups, Institutional Investors, Hedge Funds, Alternative Investment, Law and Finance, Law and Politics, Chinese Economic Policies, Chinese Corporate Governance, Corporate Governance and Economic Policies in East Asia.

Recent publications:

  • Related Party Transactions in China, In The Law And Finance Of Related Party Transactions: A Comparative Analysis (University Of Oxford Project), Cambridge University Press (Forthcoming, 2018) (Single-Authored)
  • ‘Game of Thrones’: Children’s Competition and Corporate Governance Issues in Family-Controlled Corporations, Berkeley Business Law Journal (Forthcoming, 2017) (Single-Authored)
  • The Independent Director System in China: Weaknesses, Dilemmas, and Potential Silver Linings, Tsinghua China Law Review (2017) (Single-Authored)
  • Rethinking Self-Dealing and the Fairness Test: A Law and Economics Framework for Internal Transactions in Corporate Groups, Virginia Law & Business Review (2016) (Single-Authored)
  • Tension Between Shareholder Primacy and (Quasi) Monopoly: A Theoretical Analysis of Controlling Shareholder Economies and China, University Of Pennsylvania East Asia Law Review (2015) (Single-Authored)
  • ‘Generous Thieves’: The Puzzle of Controlling Shareholder Arrangements in Bad-Law Jurisdictions, Stanford Journal of Law, Business & Finance (2015) (Single-Authored)
  • Taking Voting Leverage and Anti-Director Rights More Seriously: A Critical Analysis of the Law and Finance Theory, Columbia Journal of Asian Law (2015) (Single-Authored)